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I.

Introduction
Expert testimony can be very useful in aiding the trier of fact to reach an informed

decision. A competent expert testifying in a scientifically grounded area can make the
understanding of technical and complex evidence possible to a layperson. What happens though
when an expert testifies under bad faith? The consequences of such testimony can be disastrous.
This paper examines the difficulty faced by criminal defense attorneys during a criminal trial
when the expert witness is either lying or is flagrantly using unscientific methods to help the
prosecution prove its case. First, by describing the actions of two prolific, forensic examiners
from Mississippi who frequently testified in bad-faith. Second, by an analysis of how Daubert
hearings are ill-equipped to deal with such experts. Third, possible avenues to exclude or reduce
the damage for the defense of bad-faith expert testimony. Fourth and finally, how the standard
of review for evidentiary matters prevents courts from overturning bad-faith experts. The flaws
inherent in the Daubet hearing process, the difficulty of excluding bad-faith expert testimony,
and the standard of review for the inclusion or exclusion of bad-faith experts results in the unjust
conviction and sentencing of many innocent people.
Part one describes the actions of two expert witnesses who repeatedly acted in bad-faith.
Dr. Stephen Hayne (“Hayne”) worked as a forensic pathologist in the state of Mississippi.1 He
testified on numerous occasions in criminal and civil trials as an expert witness.2 Michael West
(“West”) is a dentist who claimed to be an expert in Forensic Odontology.3 By himself, and in
conjunction with Hayne, West testified as an expert witness many times.4 Both of these experts
1

Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Autopsies by Doctor in Question, N.Y. Times, January 8, 2013, at
A11.
2

Id.
Radley Balko, Manufacturing Guilt?, REASON MAGAZINE (Feb. 19, 2009)
http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/19/manufacturing-guilt/print.
4
Id.
3

3

used flawed science and unproven methods as a basis for their expert opinions, yet they were
allowed to testify time and time again.5 The story of these experts demonstrates how difficult it
is for defense counsel to prevent unreliable expert testimony from being admitted.
Part two examines and explains the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
interpreted by Daubert for expert testimony. Three Supreme Court decisions: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals6, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael7, and General Electric v. Joiner8
changed the face of expert testimony in the federal court system. Before Daubert, the standard
for admission of expert testimony was established by Fry v. United States.9 Under Fry, an
expert’s opinion had to “have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”10 The Daubert decision changed this standard, removing the general acceptance
requirement and requiring the judge to act as a gatekeeper.11 Many states have either adopted
this new standard or their Supreme Courts have determined that their rules of evidence are in line
with these decisions.12 Additionally, this part examines two cases where an expert testifying in
bad faith assisted the state in prosecuting an innocent person. Each of these cases was reversed
and remanded for a new trial.

5

Id.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that “general acceptance” is not
required for expert testimony and that the trail judge is responsible for insuring the reliability of
expert testimony).
7
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (applying Daubert to all expert
testimony).
8
Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, (1997) (establishing an abuse of discretion standard of
review for the admission of expert testimony).
9
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring that expert testimony gain
general acceptance in its field before being admissible).
10
Id. at 1014.
11
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
12
See, e.g., Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 43 (Miss. 2003) (adopting a
“modified Daubert test”).
6

4

Part three examines what happens if an expert witness acting in bad-faith survives a
Daubert hearing. One option to defense counsel is a motion in limine to keep the evidence out
of court under Federal Rule of Evidence 40313 (“FRE”) or Mississippi Rule of Evidence 40314
(“MRE”). Counsel will have to demonstrate that the scientific methods and processes used by the
expert witness are so unreliable, that they essentially have no probative value. One challenge
with a FRE or MRE 403 motion is that essentially the same evidence that would be introduce to
challenge the witness under a Daubert hearing will need to be used. If defense Counsel had no
luck in a Daubert hearing than they may do no better under a 403 motion. Additionally, the
standard for review for FRE and MRE 403 is abuse of discretion, so there is little hope on
appeal.15 This section also considers how a jury responds to confident expert witnesses and
looks at ways to counter them during cross-examination and summation. When dealing with
experienced expert witnesses like Hayne and West who seem to have no qualms about
exaggerating their abilities, it will be very difficult for defense Counsel to convince a judge to
exclude their testimony or a jury to ignore it.
Part four examines the standard of review for evidentiary matters. The standard of
review for admitted evidence in both Federal Court and the Mississippi State Courts is abuse of
discretion. This makes it particularly challenging for someone convicted of a crime where the
testimony of an expert witness was critical to be granted post-conviction relief. This standard of
Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence”).
14
Miss. R. Evid. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence”).
15
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997) (holding that the appellate standard of
review for a 403 balancing test is abuse of discretion).
13

5

review for the exclusion or admittance of expert testimony is especially troublesome when an
expert is allowed to testify using unscientific methods. Appellate courts are not eager to overturn
cases based on an abuse of discretion standard. The standard of admitting expert evidence under
Daubert, the challenges of excluding experts under other rules of evidence, and the deferential
standard of appellate review make it extremely difficult for defense counsel to stop bad-faith
experts from giving unscientific and unreliable testimony to a jury.
II.

Trouble in Mississippi — Faulty Science and Faulty Experts
It is difficult to find a more flagrant and tragic example of improper expert testimony

being allowed into court than that of Dr. Stephen Hayne (“Hayne”) and Michael West D.D.S.
(“West”) in Mississippi. For a period of over twenty years Hayne and West testified in hundreds
of court cases, using faulty science and unreliable methods.16 Their testimony resulted in the
death penalty and imprisonment of many individuals who were later exonerated, and countless
others who may yet be proven not guilty.17 Hayne started working as a forensic pathologist in
the early 1980’s and was able to cement himself into the Mississippi criminal court system by
positioning himself to personally conduct the majority of autopsies in the state.18 West is a
dentist who held himself to be an expert in forensic odontology (or forensic dentistry).19 He
testified in at least 100 trials and in many cases extended his expert qualifications far outside the
16

Mark Hansen, Out of the Blue, ABA Journal (Feb. 1, 1996),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/out_of_the_blue (detailing the career of West); See
also Robertson, Supra at A11 (Examining Hayne’s career).
17
See, e.g., Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787, 799 (Miss. 2007) (Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial partly due to the admission of Hayne’s testimony, the accused was 13 at the time
he was convicted of murder through a dubious two-shooter, one-gun theory); Jerry Mitchell,
Defense lawyers want review of cases involving pathologist Dr. Steven Hayne, The Clarion-Ledger,
June16, 2013 (reporting on the acquittal of Tyler Edmonds after his new trial and the Mississippi

Innocence Projects call for an investigation of the cases where Hayne testified as an expert
witness).
18
Robertson, Supra at A11.
19
Hansen, Supra.
6

realm of forensic dentistry.20 Both of these individuals relied on unsound science and unproven
methods to generate evidence that led to the successful prosecution of many innocent people.
a. Dr. Stephen Hayne
Hayne is forensic pathologist and a graduate of Brown University Medical School.21 He
began working as a forensic pathologist in the state of Mississippi in the early 1980’s.22
Conducting between 15,000 and 16,000 autopsies a year,23 Hayne quickly came to dominate the
field of forensic pathology in Mississippi.24 This number is considerably higher than the 400
autopsies per year that the National Association of Medical Examiners recommends.25 This
breaks down to between 28 and 30 autopsies a week. In addition to this heavy workload, Hayne
worked as the medical director of a hospital and testified in court two to four times a week in
Mississippi and Louisiana.26
Hayne testified between 2,500 and 3,000 times in court as a forensic pathologist.27
Despite all his testimony, Hayne has never been certified by the American Board of Pathology. 28
He attempted to take the certification exam on one occasion in the 1980’s, but has testified he
walked out because the questions were absurd.29 This forced him to resign from the position of
Interim State Medical Examiner, which he held for approximately two years, because this

20

Id. (discussing the other areas in which West would testify including shoe-print identification).
Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Steven Hayne, Arrington v. Gilmore Mem’l Hosp., 2006 Trial
Trans. LEXIS 1553, at *2-3 (No. CV01-109).
22
Robertson, Supra at A11.
23
Transcript of Hayne Testimony, Supra at *39-41.
24
Robertson, Supra at A11.
25
Transcript of Hayne Testimony, Supra at *39-41.
26
Radley Balko, Cross Country: CSI: Mississippi, The Wall Street Jounal, October 6, 2007, at
A20.
27
Transcript of Trial at 541-19, State v. Harvard, (2002) (No.0141).
28
Radley Balko, CSI: Mississippi, REASON MAGAZINE, October 8, 2007,
http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/08/csi-mississippi/print.
29
Id.
21

7

position requires certification by the American Board of Pathology. 30 Other than Hayne’s
tenure, and a few other brief periods, the position of State Medical Examiner for Mississippi has
remained unfilled since 1995.31 Hayne filled in by conducting the vast majority of the state’s
autopsies, until he was forced to stop in the mid 2000’s.32
One notable example of Hayne’s “creative” forensic methods was when he exhumed a
boy several weeks after he had been buried because of a statement by the boy’s brother that his
mother’s boyfriend had killed him.33 Hayne made a cast of the boy’s face, and compared it with
his notes from the previous autopsy he had conducted.34 The boyfriend was later convicted of
the murder because Hayne testified that the marks on the cast were consistent with a “large male
hand.”35 Another example, which will be discussed in greater detail later, is the case of Kennedy
Brewer.36 Brewer was prosecuted for raping and killing his girlfriend’s three year old
daughter.37 Hayne and West both testified that they identified bite marks on her body that
matched Brewer.38 Brewer was convicted in 1992. In 2001, DNA evidence was discovered that
exonerated him.39 He was granted a new trial in 2002 and found not guilty in 2008.40 These
brief examples illustrate the type of forensic pathology that Hayne practiced and his comfort in
testifying based on limited evidence.
30

Id.
Shelia Byrd, Watchdog Suggests Miss. Change Death Review System, THE ASSOC’D PRESS,
October 20, 2008.
32
Id.
33
Robertson, Supra at A11.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Brewer v. State, 819 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Miss. 2002).
37
Shelia Byrd, Sept. Trial of Miss. Man in Toddler Deaths Set, THE ASSOC’D PRESS, June 10,
2008.
38
Id.
39
Brewer, 819 So. 2d at 1176.
40
SHELIA BYRD, SEPT. TRIAL OF MISS. MAN IN TODDLER DEATHS SET, THE ASSOC’D. PRESS,
JUNE 10, 2008.
31
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b. Michael West D.D.S.
Michael West is a Dentist who practiced and testified as an expert witness in primarily in
forensic dentistry.41 He operated out of Mississippi and worked alongside Hayne.42 West
testified in nearly 100 trials as an expert witness.43 He used a method to find bite marks and
other evidence that he called “the West Phenomenon.”44 This method consisted of pointing a
blue ultra-violet light at an area of skin, in a completely dark room, and examining the skin while
wearing orange tinted glasses.45 He compared his accuracy using this, and other methods to
“something less than the error rate of [his] savior, Jesus Christ.”46
West frequently assisted Hayne in his autopsies.47 He was brought into court to testify
many times.48 This may have been because while using the “West Phenomenon” he was able to
see evidence that no one else was able to see (even while using his method).49 Or, it may be that
he was liked by the prosecution for his ability to fabricate evidence. In at least one case there is
video evidence of West roughly pressing a dental mold of a suspect onto a victim’s skin in
multiple places, including over bruises.50 Rather than use the standard phrase of “to a medical

41

Newsweek Staff, A Dentist Takes the Stand, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 2001, Updated July 1,
2010. http://www.newsweek.com/dentist-takes-stand-151357.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Radley Balko, CSI: Mississippi, REASON MAGAZINE, October 8, 2007,
http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/08/csi-mississippi/print.
48
Shelia Byrd, Mississippi Bite-Mark Expert Breaks Silence for Lawsuit, THE ASSC’D PRESS,
May 1, 2009.
49
Newsweek Staff, A Dentist Takes the Stand, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 2001, Updated July 1,
2010. http://www.newsweek.com/dentist-takes-stand-151357.
50
Radley Balko, Manufacturing Guilt?, Reason Magazine (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/19/manufacturing-guilt.
9

certainty” while giving his “expert” opinion, West insisted on saying “indeed and without a
doubt.”51
Along with Hayne, West’s testimony helped put multiple people in prison who have since
been exonerated.52 He testified in the aforementioned Kennedy Brewer case53, and he used his
“West Phenomenon” to help convict Anthony Keko of murdering his ex-wife.54 Keko’s
conviction was overturned three years later because the Louisiana appeals court determined that
the trial court erred in admitting West’s testimony.55 West has since given up on forensic
dentistry, stating “I don’t want to do any more death information” and that “I’ve lost faith in the
system.56 It is unclear how many innocent people their testimony has landed in prison, either
through conviction or settlement, because Mississippi has yet to conduct a systematic review of
cases they worked on.57
III.

Difficulty in Stopping Bad-Faith Expert Testimony from Being Heard by the
Jury
The admission of expert witness testimony in Federal Court is governed by Rule 702 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”).58 Before 1993 the controlling case on the admission of
51

Hansen, Supra.
Radley Balko, CSI: Mississippi, REASON MAGAZINE, October 8, 2007,
http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/08/csi-mississippi/print.
53
Melanie Lasoff Levs, Bite-Mark Evidence Loses Teeth, ABA Journal (May 1, 2008),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/bite_mark_evidence_loses_teeth/.
54
Jim Fisher, FORENSICS UNDER FIRE 157-158 (1st ed. 2008).
55
Id.
56
Shelia Byrd, Miss. Bite-Mark Expert Breaks Silence for Lawsuit, The Assoc’d. Press, May 1,
2009.
57
Robertson, Supra.
58
FED. R. EVID. 702:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
52
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expert testimony was Fry v. United States.59 The standard for admitting expert testimony under
Fry was that a particular skill or expertise be recognized as valid in the expert’s field.60 In 1993
the Supreme Court held in Daubert that “general acceptance” is not mentioned in FRE 702 and
that Fry was superseded by the adoption of the FRE.61 The court named the trial judge as a
gatekeeper62 and listed several factors for consideration in determining whether to allow an
expert to testify.63 In many ways Daubert has improved the quality of the science behind expert
witness testimony that is allowed into court, but it does not seem to help when bad-faith experts
like Hayes and West take the stand.64
a. Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, the Judge as the Gatekeeper
In Daubert, the Supreme Court stepped away from the old Fry standard, determining that
FRE 703 superseded Fry. The Court stated that the trial judge would act as a gatekeeper,65
responsible for determining if an expert’s testimony “rests on a reliable foundation and is

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
Daubert, Supra at 585 (“In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the "general
acceptance" test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence at trial”).
60
Frye, Supra at 1014 (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”).
61
Daubert, Supra at 587.
62
Id. at 597.
63
Id. at 593-594.
64
See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455-456 (2000) (affirming the exclusion of
an unreliable witness).
65
Daubert, Supra at 597.
59
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relevant to the task at hand.”66 Later, the Court held in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael that the
judge’s gatekeeping function applied to all expert testimony and that Daubert style questions can
be asked regardless of whether an expert is testifying on a scientific subject or not.67
Additionally, in General Elec. v. Joiner the court held that the proper standard of review for
decisions to allow or disallow scientific expert testimony is abuse of discretion.68
In Daubert, the petitioners sought to overturn a lower court decision to exclude their
expert witnesses based on the Fry standard.69 The Fry standard required that the scientific bases
for expert testimony must have “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”70 The framework set forth in Daubert established a gatekeeping roll for the judge in
determining the scientific validity of expert testimony.71 FRE 701 is mirrored by Rule 702 of the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence (“MRE”).72 In the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. the Supreme Court of the United States outlined the factors required for the

66

Id. at 597.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
68
GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the
proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific
evidence”).
69
Daubert, Supra at 583.
70
Frye, Supra at 1014.
71
Daubert, Supra at 597.
72
MISS. R. EVID. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
67

12

admission of expert testimony.73 The Daubert framework was ruled to apply to MRE 702 by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in 2003.74
The Court in Daubert laid out a series of factors for judges to consider when determining
if a “theory or technique is scientific knowledge.”75 The first is “whether it can be (and has been)
tested.”76 Second, “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication.”77 Third, the “known or potential rate of error” for a scientific technique.78 Forth,
how generally accepted is the theory or technique?79 These factors are not dispositive and judges
are able to tailor them to fit a particular situation.80
The first factor described in Daubert, “whether it can be (and has been) tested” is the
most important and fundamental factor.81 Looking at West’s claims, he used a blue ultra-violet
light and orange goggles to find bite-marks on bodies.82 He calls this method the “West
Phenomenon.”83 Under this light he has claimed to see evidence that other forensic scientist
can’t replicate.84 Reproducible results from independent researchers are vital to the scientific
method. A process such as the “West Phenomenon” that can’t be reproduced clearly falls out of

73

Daubert,Supra at 590.
Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 39 (2003).
75
Daubert, Supra at 593-594.
76
Id. at 593.
77
Id. at 593.
78
Id. at 594.
79
Id. at 594.
80
Id. at 594-595 (“the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. 12 Its
overarching subject is the scientific validity — and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability
— of the principles that underlie a proposed submission”)
81
Id. at 593 (testability is a “key question to be answered”).
82
Radley Balko, CSI: Mississippi, REASON MAGAZINE, October 8, 2007,
http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/08/csi-mississippi/print.
83
Id.
84
Mark Hansen, Out of the Blue, ABA Journal (Feb. 1, 1996),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/out_of_the_blue.
74
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the bounds of science. A lone researcher testing equipment he developed cannot say that he has
proven his equipment works until someone else tests it out.
Hayne and West gave expert testimony that purported to be scientific, but much of it was
actually experienced based. After Daubert there was some dispute over whether the Daubert
factors applied only to scientific testimony or to expert testimony in general.85 In Kumho the
Supreme Court held that all expert testimony is subject to Daubert analysis.86 Kumho was a
products liability case over an alleged defective tire.87 One of the issues was whether or not
Daubert applied to an engineer testifying as an expert witness.88 The Court stated that the list of
factors in Daubert was meant to be flexible, not definitive.89 These factors can also be applied to
experienced based expert testimony.90 Therefore, in light of Kumho, the Daubert analysis applies
to expert medical testimony and would apply to both Hanye’s and West’s testimony.
b. Daubert’s Fails in the Presence of Bad-Faith Expert Testimony
The following two cases demonstrate how testimony from experts acting in bad-faith can
get through a Daubert hearing and be presented to a jury. The first case is Tyler Edmonds, a 13
year old boy from Mississippi who was convicted of murder with the assistance of Hayne’s twoperson, one-gun theory. 91 The second case is that of Kennedy Brewer. Brewer was convicted of

85

See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled by Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that the Daubert factor only apply to
scientific expert testimony). See also United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir.
1999) overruled by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
86
Kumho, Supra at 591 (holding the Daubert factors are “to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”)
87
Id. at 142.
88
Id. at 145-146.
89
Id. at 151
90
Id.
91
Edmonds v. State, Supra 790.
14

the rape and murder of his girlfriend’s three year old daughter.92 Either Hayne or West testified
in each of these trials as an expert witness. Edmonds and Brewer were eventually exonerated.93
i.

Tyler Edmonds — Expert Witnesses Testifying in Bad-Faith are Difficult to Detect
under Daubert
The decision of the trial court to allow Hayne to testify outside his area of expertise

shows a weakness in the Daubert factors when applied to experts testifying in bad-faith. Under
Daubert the court should consider a series of factors to determine if an expert’s methodology and
testimony follows scientific principles.94 Tyler Edmonds was charged with murdering his halfsister’s husband in 2003.95 He was 13 years old at the time.96 Edmonds was picked up by his
half-sister, with whom he shared a father, to stay at her house over the weekend.97 His sister
asked him to bring his .22 rifle with him when he came over to her house.98 At approximately
4:00am Edmonds was awoken by his sister and they ostensibly shot his sister’s husband with the
.22.99 Both siblings turned themselves in to the police and Edmonds confessed to the Murder.100
His sister remained silent. Edmonds was later convicted of the murder by a jury and sentenced
to life in prison.101 At trial, Hayne testified that based on the injuries he observed in the victim,

92

Brewer v. State, Supra 1171.
See Jerry Mitchell, Pathologist’s Credibility on Line, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Nov. 6, 2012)
(reporting the acquittal of Tyler Edmonds in a new trial after his prior conviction was reversed
and remanded); Shelia Byrd, Sept. Trial of Miss. Man in Toddler Deaths Set, THE ASSOC’D.
PRESS, June 10, 2008 (reporting the acquittal of Kennedy Brewer in his new trial).
94
Daubert, Supra at 592-593.
95
Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 864, 869 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), overruled by Edmonds v. State,
955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
96
Edmonds, Supra 955 So. 2d at 700.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 701
101
Id.
93
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the gun was held by two individuals who both pulled the trigger at the same time.102 Edmond’s
attorney raised an objection and requested a Doubert hearing, but the trial court denied the
request.103 The court did, however, allow both counsel to approach the bench and argue whether
or not Hayne’s testimony was outside his scope of expertise.104 On appeal the Supreme Court
held that the court erroneously allowed Hayne to testify.105 They reversed and remanded on
several grounds. Edmonds was given a new trial and he was acquitted.106
Hayne’s testimony was based on opinion, and not a very sound one. By admitting
Hayne’s testimony, the court allowed bad science to be heard by the jury. This is directly
opposed to the principles of sound science championed by Daubert. The question is, what is a
defense attorney supposed to do? When confronted by an expert witness who begins to wonder
outside his realm of expertise, how can one stop the testimony? In this case the attorney objected
and asked for a Daubert hearing, which the court denied. This does not bode well for defense
attorneys because the standard of review for evidentiary appeals is an abuse of discretion. 107 The
inability of a defense attorney to prevent the jury from hearing unscientific expert testimony
when that expert is acting in bad-faith, and then is hamstrung on appeal by a deferential standard
of review, demonstrates a serious problem under the current rules of evidence.
ii.

Kennedy Brewer — Doubling Down on Bad Science
A second problem with the current rules of evidence when an expert is testifying in bad-

faith occurs when the defense hires its own expert to counter that of the prosecution. A battle of
the experts can ensue, where both experts are relying on unproven science and lending each102

Id. at 791-792.
Id.
104
Id. at 792.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 799.
107
Joiner, Supra at 142-143.
103
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other credibility. Kennedy Brewer was left to baby-sit his girlfriend’s daughter while she went
out with her sister.108 When his girlfriend returned she went to bed without checking on her
daughter.109 In the morning when she and Brewer woke up, her daughter was missing.110 She
was later found dead behind their house.111 Hayne was brought in to conduct an autopsy.112 He
determined that the girl was raped and strangled to death.113 He also found what he believed to
be bite marks, so he called in West to examine the body.114 West determined that the teeth marks
belonged to Brewer to a “reasonable medical certainty.”115 The defense’s expert witness testified
that none of the marks were bite-marks because there were no marks from a lower jaw.116
Brewer was found guilty of capital murder while engaged in sexual battery and was sentenced to
death by lethal injection117
On appeal, the Brewer raised the issue of West’s qualification as an expert.118 The
appellant court denied relief, even though Brewer demonstrated past instances where West had
stepped outside the bounds of proven science.119 The court ruled that his past use of unscientific
methods should go to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not to his qualifications as an
expert.120 Additionally, the defense’s own expert agreed that the technique of matching a mold
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of Brewer’s teeth to marks on the body was acceptable and is the same method he used.121 In
2001, a DNA test excluded Brewer as the murderer and he was given a new trial.122 He was
found not guilty in 2008.123
A problem in this case is that when the defense hires its own expert witness to rebut the
prosecution’s witness, and the underlying science that both parties are using is unreliable, then a
battle of the experts arises where neither side can effectively attack the other experts underlying
methodology. The “science” of bite mark analysis is far from settled.124 When an expert for the
prosecution is allowed to testify and will be basing that testimony on bad science, it puts the
defense in a difficult position. If they do not bring in their own witness to rebut, the jury will
only hear the prosecution’s expert. If they bring in a witness, and that witness uses the same bad
science as the prosecutions witness, then they will have increased the credibility of the
prosecution’s witness. This demonstrates a flaw, in at least the application of Daubert and the
unwillingness of courts to seriously examine the underlying science behind expert testimony.
IV.

The Probative Value of Bad Evidence

One mode of attack against an expert witness who is suspected of using unscientific methods
or testifying in bad-faith in addition to a Daubert challenge is a motion in limine to exclude him
under FRE 403.125 If a Daubert challenge and a motion to exclude under 403 are ineffective, the
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defense is limited to cross-examination and summation to convince the jury to discount the
expert’s testimony.
a. FRE 403 and MRE 403
FRE 403 provides a balancing test between the probative value of proffered evidence and the
danger of unfair prejudice.126 If defense Counsel can demonstrate that the methods of an expert
witness are unscientifically based then their probative value is significantly decreased.
Additionally, if some doubt as to the expert’s credentials can be shown then the scales of the
probative value vs. unfair prejudice scales tip in the favor of unfair prejudice. Generally, courts
are reluctant to exclude testimony based on FRE 403 because even beginning the 403 analysis
tends to show that the evidence in question has some probative value.127 In a situation when a
defense attorney is dealing with an expert who is able to make pseudoscience sound believable, it
is very difficult to argue that the witness’ testimony has no probative value. It is possible to get a
limiting instruction, telling the jury to focus only on the testimony that the expert witness is
qualified to give.128 This is a poorer option than having the witness completely excluded because
no matter what instructions the judge gives to a jury, no one can control what happens in
deliberations and no one knows what the jury is actually thinking.
If a Daubert challenge and a motion in limine to exclude under FRE 403 are unsuccessful
than it is up to defense counsel to convince the jury in cross-examination and summation that
they should discount the expert’s testimony. This can be very difficult, especially with seasoned
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experts like Hayne and West who are able to articulate their pseudoscience with confidence and
statements like “indeed and without a doubt.”129
b. The Challenge of Convincing a Jury to Disregard Expert Testimony
If an expert witness testifying in bad-faith gets past a Daubert hearing and survives a 403
motion, then the jury will hear the expert’s testimony. A confident witness will likely seem more
credible to jurors. Someone with the trial experience of Hayne130, or the self-confidence of
West.131 There is some evidence that juries are more differential towards the opinions of
experts.132 This link between confidence and credibility and the difficulty in challenging experts
who testify in bad faith make it especially difficult to convince jurors to disregard expert
testimony.
i.

The Link between Confidence and Credibility

Beyond the common sense problem of jurors naturally respecting and giving extra weight to
expert testimony, there are studies that show jurors believe experts who are confident in their
testimony.133 A 2009 study showed that jurors may overcome a conflicted conscious about
sentencing a defendant to death due to testimony when an expert “is perceived to possess
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sufficient knowledge and to convey an air of trust or integrity.”134 Additionally, different jurors
react different to experts depending on the juror’s personality.135
An expert with as much experience as Hayne or West is in a position to seem confident
on the stand. This confidence has the power to influence jurors and make them seem more
impressive. No matter how unscientifically grounded their testimony, there is a good chance that
the jury will give extra weight to their statements. In addition to experience building confidence,
the sheer number of cases that Hayes has testified in has the tendency to build jury confidence.
This is a tactical consideration that a defense attorney would want to carefully ponder before
cross-examination.
ii.

The Challenge of Challenging — Cross Examination of Experts who are Testifying in
Bad-Faith
If an expert witness is believed to be exaggerating their abilities, lying about the scientific

basis for their analysis, or stepping outside their realm of expertise cross examination may, or
may not, be a great opportunity to reduce their credibility. If the expert is comfortable on the
stand, and willing to stand by their statements, it may be difficult to trip them up.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure136 govern the discovery process for expert witnesses in
a criminal case. This is a much more limited discovery process than the depositions available in
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a civil matter. This makes cross-examination all the more difficult. A defense attorney doesn’t
have depositions to use to demonstrate a prior inconsistent statement. They will have to use
whatever summary the expert provides to prepare for trial and try to impeach the witness based
on their direct examination.
V.

The Abuse of Discretion Standard for Appellate Review
The standard of review for evidentiary appeals is abuse of discretion.137 This standard of

review gives particularly strong deference to a trial court’s decision.138 This is the same standard
of review given to other evidentiary decisions by a court.139 A deferential standard for expert
witness exclusion or non-exclusion makes sense in a lot of ways, but it can be disastrous for a
criminal defendant facing an expert witness who is acting in bad-faith.
a. The Standard of Review for Expert Exclusion as set by Joiner
After Daubert, Joiner set the standard of review for the decision of a court to exclude or
allow expert testimony in a Daubert hearing as abuse of discretion.140 The plaintiff in Joiner
called an expert witness to testify that his lung cancer was “promoted” by his exposure to certain
plastics at work.141 The trial court granted a defense motion for summary judgment after
excluding the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony under a Daubert analysis.142 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.143 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh
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Circuit decision stating that abuse of discretion is the correct standard of review for evidentiary
decisions.144
Similarly in Mississippi, where Hayes and West made the vast majority of their
appearances as expert witnesses, the standard of review for trial court exclusion of experts is
abuse of discretion.145 This has led to higher courts consistently affirming lower court decisions
to allow Hayne and West to testify, despite the widespread knowledge about the problems with
their testimony.146
b. The Difficulty with Joiner as Applied to Expert Witnesses Testifying in Bad-Faith
After Daubert trial court judges play a much larger role in determining what expert
opinions get in front of a jury. These judges, though not unintelligent, are generally not
scientists by training. The abuse of discretion standard makes it much more likely that they will
show deference to the lower court’s evidentiary rulings.147
When expert witnesses like Hayne or West testify in bad-faith, the defense can easily fall
into a bad situation. If an expert makes it through a Daubert hearing and the defense loses, it
will be very difficult to overturn that decision.
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c. David Williams — the Value of Raising Objections
David Williams, a college student at the University of Mississippi, was convicted of the
murder of his girlfriend. 148 She was found dead in the closet of his home with a stab wound in
her chest.149

Williams He claimed that they had a suicide pact and that when they decided to go

through with it, he was too drunk and high to kill himself and he lost consciousness.150 When he
awoke he found his girlfriend dead with a kitchen knife in her chest.151 Williams waited several
days before telling his parents what had happened.152 His parents contacted an attorney,
contacted the authorities, and checked Williams into a hospital.153 Williams was charged with
murder.154 Hayne testified at his trial that it was unlikely his girlfriend had committed suicide
because of bruising around the neck and the rarity of someone stabbing themselves in the chest
to commit suicide.155 No objection to Hayne’s testimony was raised and the defense provided
their own expert who did not share Hayne’s opinion about the existence of bruising around the
deceased’s neck.156 Williams was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.157
On appeal, Williams claimed that the court erred by allowing Hayne to testify. 158 The
court determined that since Williams had not raised an objection to Hayne’s testimony at trial,
that a standard of plain error for his testimony to be excluded.159 Needless to say the court did
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not find a reason to exclude the testimony.160 The appellate court affirmed Williams’ conviction
but the case was overturned by the Mississippi Supreme Court on other grounds.161 Williams
entered into a plea deal for culpable negligent manslaughter and was sentenced to 20 years in
prison.162
This change in the standard of review is an important consideration when determining the
defense’s trial strategy. Even if the defense council knows that the expert will be allowed to
testify, it makes a lot of since to raise a reasonable objection to an expert to preserve the client’s
rights on appeal. Hayne was important to the prosecution and the forensic medical examiner
community in Mississippi because of the massive number of autopsies that he performed.163
That importance, combined with the controversial nature of his testimony, may have been why
he was personally named, and cited as an expert witness who could testify in several Mississippi
Supreme Court Cases.
First, in Edmonds v. State although the court says his evidence should not be admissible,
it goes out of its way to mention that Hayne is “qualified to proffer expert opinions in forensic
pathology.” 164 In his concurrence, Justice Diaz states that the court should not qualify Hayne as
an expert165 because “one generation’s expert is another’s quack”166 It seems that his concerns
were valid because two years later in Nelson v. State the Edmonds opinion cited Edmonds stating
that Hayne was qualified to give expert opinions in forensic pathology.167
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Reliance on previous acceptance of Hayne as an expert to justify current acceptance is
not limited to those two cases. In Lima v. State, the Supreme Court of Mississippi made sure to
explain that Hayne was an expert in the field of forensic pathology.168 The court stated that
although Hayne performs many more autopsies than is recommended, he “does not take
vacations and works nearly every day of the year, for approximately sixteen hours a day.” 169
Then in a case decided by the same court less than two months later, the court cites Lima and
reiterates that “we find that Hayne was qualified to testify as an expert. And we find no evidence
to establish that his testimony was unreliable.”170 It is clear that even after Edmonds171 and all
the previously cited news stories and cases of exhumations, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
was not ready to give up on allowing Hayne to testify as an expert witness.
VI.

Conclusion
Expert witnesses who lie, base their testimony off of unscientific and unproven forensics,

or who testify outside their area of expertise do damage not only to the lives of those who are
wrongly convicted, but to our entire legal system. The story of Hayne and West and their
flagrant disregard for accurate forensics analysis is very disturbing. From the lack of
oversight172 to the number of cases that Hayne worked on173 raises serious concerns as to what
would be found if a serious examination of Hayne and West’s past cases were to occur.
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The difficulty that courts face in excluding experts who testify in bad-faith under
Daubert, even under the guiding factors is very serious.174 Examining cases like those of Tyler
Edmonds and Kennedy Brewer helps illuminate problems with the current system.
A real problem for practitioners is how to convince courts that there is a lack of probative
value to an expert witness testifying in bad-faith. Additionally, it is very difficult to convince a
jury to ignore or reduce their reliance on expert testimony. Finally, the standard of review as
abuse of discretion poses a particular challenge in cases where an expert witness is only
discovered to have been testifying using unscientific methods after a conviction.
The flaws inherent in the Daubet hearing process, the difficulty of excluding bad-faith
expert testimony, and the standard of review for the inclusion or exclusion of bad-faith experts
will be a serious challenge going forward. Only through the continued improvement of real,
science based forensic methods will we be able to reduce the number of wrongly convicted
people who are sent to prison.
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